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ABSTRACT 
This teaching case features a situation at Belgacom, the leading telecommunications company in 
Belgium, end of April 2005. Wim Bouckenooghe, newly appointed finance director of Belgacom’s 
Network and IT division within the Fixed Line Services (FLS) segment, is troubled by the 
effectiveness of the selection of the discretionary IT projects, particularly the larger ones. He is 
especially concerned about the early stages of developing ideas into project proposals and the 
prioritization of these proposals for selection for development into full, detailed business cases. 
Bouckenooghe is keen to raise his doubts and propose improvements at the next quarterly 
meeting of the FLS management committee in July. The teaching case is designed to enable a 
multifaceted class discussion on the principles, tools, and practices of IT project selection, with a 
special focus on the early assessment and funneling of project ideas. 
KEYWORDS: IT investment management, IT project selection, IT project prioritization, IT 
portfolio management 
I. SITUATION INTRODUCTION 
On a warm spring morning toward the end of April 2005, Wim Bouckenooghe, newly appointed 
finance director of Belgacom’s Network and IT division within the Fixed Line Services (FLS) 
segment, was sitting in his office high over the busy streets of Brussels contemplating his new 
responsibilities. Network and IT had recently merged into one division. Bouckenooghe was made 
responsible for controlling the allocation and usage of the FLS capital expenditure (CAPEX1) 
budget. Bouckenooghe had been appointed to his current position from within the central finance 
department, where he had led a team of financial analysts preparing and presenting the financial 
case for new projects.  
                                                     
1 Capital expenditure (CAPEX) is an investment made by a company to acquire or develop 
property, plant, and equipment assets, usually with the expectation that it will benefit the company 
for a significant period of time. Both investments in software and hardware can be capital 
expenditure items. Operational expenditure (OPEX) in contrast is an expense incurred in 
conducting normal business operations. Operating expenses may include wages, salaries, 
administrative and research and development costs, but excludes interest, depreciation, and 
taxes. 
Communications of the Association for Information Systems (Volume 19, 2007), 47-60 48 
Belgacom: IT Project Selection 2005 by S. Viaene, S. Fagan, and S. Almeida 
Bouckenooghe was reflecting on the selection of discretionary IT projects, particularly the larger 
ones. Some 15 percent or €50 million of FLS CAPEX was allocated to these projects, which 
ranged from short-term “quick wins” with short lifetimes to infrastructure projects with expected 
lifetimes of more than 10 years. These investments were generally believed to have a significant 
impact on the organization’s financial performance and its future strategic options. In an 
increasingly competitive marketplace it was vital that the most valuable projects were identified 
and supported. 
Bouckenooghe was especially concerned about the early stages of developing ideas into project 
proposals and the prioritization of these proposals for selection for development into full, detailed 
business cases. Bouckenooghe’s experience with the process had led him to doubt its 
effectiveness. Moreover, a recent tour of the company had shown Bouckenooghe that many 
stakeholders shared some of his concerns. For example, the head of FLS was clearly in favor of 
using a formal selection process, but remained concerned about the balance of rigor and timing. 
We absolutely need a formal FLS process like the one we currently have for 
filtering ideas into projects that are proposed to be implemented. How else can 
we objectively balance our FLS investment for operational efficiencies, business 
continuity risk, and future business? The thing is that we have a hard time 
making the process both rigorous and fast at the same time. (Bridget Cosgrave, 
Head of FLS) 
The head of Network and IT continued to stress the need for a robust type of project selection 
and a consistent focus on value delivery for the company. 
What we really need is a 'fast ideas filter' that immediately kills off bad project 
ideas. Instead, we all too often get lost in detailed financial cases that prove to be 
unstable and unreliable anyway in the early stages of idea generation. We are 
not yet at the level where we consistently select projects on the basis of best 
value for our shareholders and deliver according to the selection we made. 
(Philippe Ribonnet, Head of FLS Network and IT) 
Facilitating the early stages of the discretionary project selection process with the right data 
remained the primary challenge from the point of view of the people at FLS’s Program and 
Processes Office (POP). 
The difficulty in a proposal prioritization process like this is to collect the right 
data for each project idea in a standard way. On top of that, all these data have 
to be validated and challenged in a very short time frame and project proposals 
do not always have the same level of maturity. Now, before we had a formal 
FLS-level process like the one we have today there was too much room for 
political and power games between the FLS divisions to get to the money. (Jean-
Marc Verbist, Head of FLS Program and Processes Office) 
The selection process as it stood had taken out much of the political and power games. This was 
generally recognized as a good thing by the FLS divisions. Still, keeping everyone happy was not 
easy. 
When a project becomes too big or has an impact on more than just marketing, 
then we nowadays compete for the investment money at the FLS level. The 
challenge at this level, and it still stands, is to be able to make the case for local 
as well as global innovation, that is, innovation at the level of both the division as 
well as the segment. Moreover, a tuned selection process helps us get buy-in 
across the divisions as well as allows us to develop a balanced project portfolio 
along the different axes of our strategy.(Walter Gelens, Head of FLS Marketing) 
 
Now that he was responsible for controlling CAPEX, Bouckenooghe was keen to raise the doubts 
he had and review the selection process’ effectiveness. Time was short, though, with next year’s 
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budget allocation rapidly approaching. Bouckenooghe knew that any changes needed would 
have to be recommended quickly to the FLS management committee. If changes were to be 
implemented in time for the next run of the budgeting process, starting in October and scheduled 
to be finished six weeks later, they needed to be on the agenda of next quarter’s meeting of the 
management committee. 
II. BELGACOM BACKGROUND 
Belgacom was the leading telecommunications company in Belgium and the national market 
leader in retail and wholesale fixed line services, mobile communications, broadband, and 
Internet services. In 2004, the company achieved an EBITDA of €2,353 million and net income of 
€922 million. The company operated in both infrastructure and service areas of the 
telecommunications industry, possessing mobile and fixed-line networks and providing services 
on them. The past decade had seen a great deal of change within Belgacom. The previously 
state-owned operator had been floated on the stock market, restructuring programs had shrunk 
the workforce from 26,000 to 16,000, and there had been frequent changes to the company’s 
organizational structure.  
Belgacom’s FLS segment operated and controlled the company’s fixed telephone line 
infrastructure and services. An organization chart showing the company structure is given in 
Exhibit 1. Alongside traditional analogue voice lines, a number of digital data services were 
provided within the fixed-line network infrastructure, enabled by recent technological advances. 
FLS provided a total of approximately 5.3 million fixed lines to customers, including almost 1 
million ISDN lines and 900,000 ADSL lines.  
III. IT PROJECTS 
Telecommunications is an IT intensive industry. A strong IT portfolio is a necessary asset 
to succeed on the marketplace. (Bridget Cosgrave, Head of FLS) 
IT was fundamental to Belgacom’s business. Belgacom’s new product offerings such as ADSL 
and VDSL (fast Internet connections), interactive digital TV, and advanced mobile phone services 
such as 3G (real-time video communication) were all bolstered by advanced hardware and 
software developments. It was also IT that fundamentally enabled efficient and high-quality 
customer service, as well as allowed Belgacom to present “one face” to its customers across 
different channels. Regulation and legal requirements were also regularly prompting Belgacom to 
invest in IT. For example, network operators like Belgacom, that used to be state-owned 
monopolists, were forced to open up their proprietary physical network infrastructure to competing 
operators. This called for IT-enabled tools to track network usage to be able to charge 
interconnection fees. 
FLS CAPEX investment per year approximated €330 million, supporting a wide range of project 
types and sizes (see Exhibit 2): 
• Infrastructure Maintenance: The “like for like” replacement of existing IT or network 
infrastructure with newer equipment. 
• Network Growth: The expansion of the existing network to enable a larger number of 
consumers to access existing products. For example, Belgacom was building out its fiber 
optic cable network to expand access to broadband Internet connections that were 
currently used by 37 percent of the Belgian population. In 2004, €83 million was invested 
in this and in building a VDSL platform to serve broadband users. Broadband was 
considered of the utmost importance to the future of Belgacom. The expansion of the 
broadband network was a “top-down” project, mandated by the company board and 
centrally monitored by Belgacom’s strategy department. 
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• Discretionary Projects: Most FLS projects were proposed at the discretion of one of its 
divisions. Discretionary projects included a number of project types with a variety of aims. 
The ultimate aim was to help Belgacom achieve its strategic objective of being “Best in 
Class” through “Profitable Growth,” “Operational Efficiency,” and “Market Leadership.”2 
Belgacom’s strategic objectives are shown in Exhibit 3. Some of the discretionary 
projects were also initiated by regulatory requirements, such as enabling other operators 
to access Belgacom’s physical network infrastructure. 
FLS discretionary projects accounted for some 15 percent of FLS CAPEX and 41 percent of FLS 
IT personnel resources annually, the remaining 59 percent of IT personnel resources being 
devoted to “lights-on” support and maintenance operations.3 Both CAPEX and IT development 
time were carefully budgeted and monitored, as they were considered, partly for historical 
reasons, some of the scarcest resources. 
The focus on CAPEX was prompted by the telecommunications stock market downturn of 2000-
2001. While the fall in share prices may have made telecom assets cheaper to acquire, it had the 
effect of restricting the capital available for incumbents to invest and concentrated their attention 
on how the limited amounts available could best be spent. In any case, capital was becoming 
increasingly restricted for the European telecommunications industry due to increasing 
competition following market deregulation. 
Human IT development resources were recognized as important and limited prior to the year 
2000, when significant IT time had been invested in system modifications to avert possible 
millennium bug problems. Formal and thorough monitoring and control of IT personnel resources 
and their performance was instituted at this time. The use and cost of these resources was highly 
visible within the company. 
IV. PROJECT PROPOSAL ASSESSMENT ISSUES 
Some project ideas are especially hard to assess early on in the assessment process. 
Proposals that involve the use of new technologies or that re-architect existing 
infrastructure are among those. (Jean-Marc Verbist, Head of FLS Program and 
Processes Office) 
NetMan was one of the projects that had sparked Bouckenooghe’s concerns with project 
selection and prioritization. The NetMan project catered for the replacement of Belgacom’s FLS 
inventory management system, a system that tracked the usage of the company’s fixed line 
assets by its customers. A new system would help to keep track of the increasingly complex array 
                                                     
2 An important discretionary project that generated a lot of media attention, aimed at achieving 
market leadership, was the construction of a platform enabling the launch of Belgacom TV, the 
company’s interactive digital television offering (broadcast and on-demand), in June 2005. The 
company purchased the TV broadcasting rights to the Jupiler League, the Belgian national soccer 
championship, to promote and generate demand for the new service. Additionally, the system 
offered 55 national and international channels, video on demand, and the possibility of interactive 
television. Construction of the platform involved seven software and hardware investments. 
3 The ratio between resources devoted to “lights-on” versus new projects is often taken to 
illustrate the health of a company’s IT systems. The healthier the systems are the less 
maintenance they need and the more resources can be devoted to new, value creating 
investments. Benchmark data places Belgacom amongst leading companies. Accenture, the IT 
consulting firm, compiled data from client companies on the proportion of IT resources devoted to 
new projects and maintenance. Leading companies spent an average of 40% of resources on 
new, value creating products. See “Value discovery: a better way to prioritize IT investments” by 
Curtis, G. A., Meinicoff, R. M., and Mesoy, T. (Accenture Outlook, 3, 2003, pp. 43-49). 
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of products the company was offering. The new system aimed at providing real-time network 
usage, service level, and capacity information. Quality information on the network inventory was 
considered indispensable for operational planning, capacity management, and efficient 
installation and repair operations. The system had an expected life span of more than 10 years.  
The NetMan project involved replacing a number of interlinked inventory systems that had grown 
organically over previous decades, each with interfaces into Belgacom’s billing, ordering, and 
maintenance systems. The complexity of the existing system had caused problems in project 
specification. Both the technical solution and the proposed project scope had changed 
considerably over time. Three attempts to launch the project had been made, each with changed 
budget requirements and different projected benefits (Exhibit 4). The Net Present Value (NPV) of 
the project had trebled between the first and the most recent version of the proposal’s financial 
case, mainly due to delays in the project, enabling an additional year of benefits to be considered 
in the standard, five year business case.4  
NetMan’s expected customer service benefits had proven difficult to quantify. For one, the 
relationship between service reliability and customer retention varied strongly between products. 
For some of the products it offered, Belgacom had no direct competitors, while for others the 
competition was intense and the potential for customers to switch to or from Belgacom higher. 
The large number of customer types affected by the NetMan project meant that even a slight 
variation in any assumption of the effect of the project on customer retention could have a 
massive impact on the project’s financial assessment. Because of the difficulty in specifying a 
defensible quantification these benefits had simply been excluded from the project’s projected 
financials. 
While Bouckenooghe was clear that the high cost and complexity of the NetMan project 
contributed to the difficulties in assessing it, he felt that many of the problems were caused by the 
assessment process itself, which seemed to be unable to effectively represent the project’s true 
value to the company.  
While the financial value of NetMan may have changed by a factor of three between the 
first and last project proposal assessment rounds, the real worth of the project to the 
company in the long run has not. (Wim Bouckenooghe, Finance Director FLS Network 
and IT)  
Bouckenooghe wondered how to make a proposal’s financial criteria less sensitive to cosmetic 
changes. Could projects with different life spans be fairly assessed by a uniform-length financial 
case? And more importantly, how could project proposal assessment be redesigned to ensure 
that the difficulties in quantifying some projects’ benefits were adequately considered? All these 
questions were going through Bouckenooghe’s mind. 
V. PROJECT PRIORITIZATION AND SELECTION 
Selecting the right IT projects for investment starts with an effective funneling of ideas 
into project proposals. Moreover, bad project selection can never be compensated by 
good project execution. (Philippe Ribonnet, Head of FLS Network and IT) 
Discretionary IT projects were prioritized and selected through one of two processes depending 
upon project size. The assessment of projects requiring less than €500k CAPEX and 200 IT 
                                                     
4 The company believed that the pace of technological change made assessment of project value 
beyond a five year time horizon of limited reliability and usefulness. Also, a five year horizon was 
aligned with the investment horizon of many of its shareholders, and from a shareholder value 
perspective it was justifiable that investments were expected to perform over this timescale.  
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person-days development time were assessed with an informal “envelope” process. The budget 
for these projects was distributed to divisional heads who used it to fund what they considered to 
be the most valuable small and experimental projects within their domain. Projects that required 
more than €500k CAPEX or 200 IT person-days, or which were judged as having a “significant 
impact” on the company, were assessed through a formal, centralized process. In the first stage, 
internally abbreviated as P3 from “Project Prioritization Process,” ideas for projects were 
developed into formal proposals. The P3 process was Bouckenooghe's focus of attention and 
concern while pondering the effectiveness of project selection and prioritization. The P3 process 
is laid out in Exhibit 5. 
For each project proposal assessed in the P3 process, a project leader, commonly from the 
sponsoring division, worked together with a financial analyst from the central finance department 
to assemble the information needed to assess the project.  Information was gathered from the 
project leader’s and the financial analyst’s own knowledge and from ad hoc contacts with IT or 
other affected parties within the company.5 Contacts with the latter were made on a one-to-one 
basis via e-mail, telephone or, on some occasions, face-to-face meetings. 
A standardized submission sheet, i.e., the “P3 template,” was used to collect preliminary data on 
the proposal’s financial performance. The general classes of data used for assessing a proposal’s 
financials are depicted in Exhibit 6. NPV, Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and Pay Back Period were 
calculated for each project proposal. A constant discount rate set at the company’s weighted 
average cost of capital was used for NPV and Pay Back Period calculations. There was no 
standard hurdle rate for a project’s IRR to exceed in order to have a good chance of approval.  
Questions designed to assess the strategic value and risk of projects had recently been added to 
the assessment process. Strategic value and the risk attached to projects were calculated from 
the answers to a series of questions. See Exhibit 7 for sample questions. Bouckenooghe was 
doubtful, though, of the effectiveness of these criteria for project prioritization and selection. 
While the strategic and risk assessment scores are available to the committee 
considering the projects for approval they are not given much weight in the approval 
process. The focus remains strongly on cost and NPV. (Wim Bouckenooghe, Finance 
Director FLS Network and IT) 
Every year, in preparation for the annual budget exercise, assessment data on all proposed and 
existing projects were collected and the preferences of the divisions proposing the projects were 
gathered. The divisions were asked to rank their proposed and existing projects in order of 
importance. As a result, a single list was produced for each division containing all projects 
irrespective of type. After preferences had been collected, the comprehensiveness of the project 
data was checked by FLS’s POP. 
POP was a supportive office with important administrative, coordination, and monitoring roles. 
POP, which operated across functional divisions, facilitated and managed P3. Importantly, POP 
was responsible for scheduling resources and managing resource conflicts between initiatives. 
During P3 conflict resolution was performed at a general level, working with total budget figures 
and total IT person-day capacity. Later on in project development, when project timing and scope 
were more certain, more detailed issues such as the availability of specific skills became more 
important in resource allocation and management.  
Proposed and existing projects for which the assessment data were complete were dubbed 
“Ready for Ranking” and could pass to the next stage of the process. The next stage of the P3 
process would determine the selection of projects for which full, detailed business cases would be 
                                                     
5 The IT department did not itself propose projects for approval but was asked to help formulate 
and validate the estimates of project cost and personnel needs. 
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developed. Business cases provided more reliable and detailed information than initial project 
proposals, and hence required more time and resources to complete. Projects failing POP’s 
validation had to be rectified; otherwise they were removed from the process at this point. 
A meeting of FLS divisional representatives, i.e., the “Project Prioritization Meeting,” was 
presented with the list of project proposals labeled “Ready for Ranking.” The meeting was again 
facilitated by POP. At this stage, projects expected to be started in the next year but for which 
even preliminary information was not available could be entered into the process if management 
felt they were important. These projects were termed NEW200X projects, with 200X denoting the 
year in question. Additionally, so-called “emergency projects” could be entered into the selection. 
Divisional representatives at the meeting were presented with a list of all the proposed projects, 
organized initially by divisional preference. Preferences and priorities were debated by the 
divisional representatives, who were expected to discuss company priorities and identify the 
projects that best supported them. Bouckenooghe stressed the complex nature of these 
discussions. 
The fact that each division proposes a number of different types of projects typically 
complicates the evaluation process. (Wim Bouckenooghe, Finance Director FLS Network 
and IT) 
The ultimate outcome of the discussion was a single list of company projects, in order of 
preference, and a classification of preferential projects into the following groups: TOP, TOP200X, 
STRONG, and STRONG200X. TOP and TOP200X projects were approved to pass on to full 
development of a detailed business case. These projects were said to be “Ready for Scoping.” 
STRONG and STRONG200X projects were considered promising, but not valuable enough to 
justify the development of a business case at this time. STRONG projects could be entered anew 
into subsequent P3 exercises. Projects not considered valuable for development were rejected at 
this stage. All project decisions and rationale was fed back to the proposers. 
The projects passing P3 were assessed by a second decision-making body, i.e., the “Resource 
Allocation Committee (RAC),” on completion of the business case. The RAC was composed of 
representatives of top management of the FLS divisions (Exhibit 1). The central finance 
department as well as the divisional finance departments were also represented on the RAC. 
Projects successfully passing the RAC were given the go-ahead to begin development and 
incurring expenditure.   
Besides the P3 exercise linked to the annual budgeting process, there was an additional P3 
exercise every three months to allow new projects to get into the selection process. In March 
2005, for example, 12 new projects were entered into P³. At any one time, approximately 50 
projects had the status of having been approved in P³. These projects were being scoped or 
actively implemented. They were reassessed and reprioritized in each P³ exercise, in order to 
maintain visibility over the entire size and composition of the discretionary project portfolio. 
Accounting for the approximately 20 STRONG projects from previous P³ exercises that were 
reconsidered, a total of approximately 80 projects was assessed per exercise. 
VI. GOING FORWARD WITH P3 
The format of the current project development process at Belgacom was instituted in response to 
the recognition that only a formal, objective process could identify and approve the most valuable 
projects from the many ideas proposed. Despite the general satisfaction with the institution of a 
formal P3 process, a number of problems had caught the attention of many a stakeholder. They 
were on Bouckenooghe’s mind while contemplating his new job’s responsibilities, and, more 
importantly, the upcoming run of the budgeting process for next October. 
First, the quality of the information from which decisions on prioritization were made was not 
always deemed appropriate in P3, particularly for new projects. Project specification and projected 
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results often changed between the initial proposal and final approval of the project. This meant 
that the projects prioritized were not always the same as those actually carried out, partially 
calling into question the legitimacy of the prioritization process. Bouckenooghe felt that the cause 
of the data quality problem could lie in the current process design. Examining this in more detail 
was one of his priorities. 
Second, Bouckenooghe knew that the specific questions from which the strategic value and risk 
scores in P3 were judged could be improved. Making changes to the template questions would be 
unproblematic. More difficult was determining how the information gained could then effectively 
be used by the participants in the process. Bouckenooghe felt that project risk and strategic value 
were not brought into prioritization discussions in an informed, structured way. Moreover, 
experience had shown that decision makers at Belgacom tended to focus their attention on the 
financial measures, which they viewed as being most relevant for the business. 
Third, financial measures, risk and strategic value scores were presented to the decision-making 
body (i.e. the “Project Prioritization Meeting”) separately for about 80 projects. How could multiple 
decision variables, with different unit scales, be used to meaningfully compare projects with 
different objectives? Moreover, some of the projects being compared and prioritized had greatly 
differing strategic objectives, and differed considerably in their size and the resources required for 
completing them. This made it difficult to properly compare the value of, for example, a project 
designed to “streamline processes” with another designed to “achieve true customer intimacy.” 
Any major changes needed would have to be approved by the FLS management committee. It 
was clear that Bouckenooghe had some thinking to do before before the management committee 
convened for its next quarterly meeting in July. 
VII. SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENT QUESTIONS 
1. What are the advantages/disadvantages of having a formal IT project selection process 
and a cross-departmental approach like P3? What are the difficulties with a rigorous, 
cross-departmental selection? 
2. Do Bouckenooghe's concerns about the current project assessment in P3 seem to be 
justified? Why or why not? 
3. What, if any, aspects of the project assessment in P3 should be changed? Try to compile 
a list of suggested improvements, the actions necessary to correct the current situation, 
and the reasons underlying the suggested improvements and actions. Also, do not forget 
to assess the impact of any suggested changes. 
4. What should Bouckenooghe tell the next meeting of the management committee? 
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CAPEX  Capital Expenditure 
EBITDA Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization 
FLS Fixed Line Services: Belgacom's fixed line telephony segment, providing voice 
and data transmission infrastructure and products 
IRR  Internal Rate of Return 
IT  Information Technology 
NPV  Net Present Value 
OPEX  Operational Expenditure 
POP  Program and Processes Office 
P3 Project Prioritization Process: Belgacom's project assessment process for 
prioritizing discretionary IT investments 
RAC Resource Allocation Committee: top management group representing FLS 
divisions and assessing all discretionary project proposals involving more than 
€500k or 200 IT person days 
Exhibit 1. Belgacom‘s Division Structure 
 
 
Source: Company Information 
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Exhibit 2. FLS Supports a Range of IT Projects 
 
 
Source: Company Information 
Exhibit 3. Belgacom’s Strategic Objectives 
 
Source: Company Information 
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Change November 2004 Change 
April 
2005 
Business Case Length (years) 5  5  5 
Total CAPEX and OPEX  
(5 years) €11,000k  +20% €13,200k  -11% €11,700k 
NPV €900k  +198% €2,500k  2% €2,600k 
IRR 16%  +88% 30%  3% 31% 
Actualized Pay Back Period >4 Years  <4 Years  <4 Years 
Cost Avoidance Benefits  
(5 Years) €10,000k  +105% €20,400k  -7% €19,100k 
Cost Reduction Benefits  
(5 Years) €7,500k  -46% €4,000k  -6% €3,800k 
 
Source: Company Information 
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Exhibit 6. General Classes of Data Used in P³ Financial Analysis 
Data Included Data Excluded 
Revenue Increase from Project CAPEX Avoidance* 
Revenue Protected Proposal Development Costs 
Cost Reduction  
Cost Avoidance  
Cost of Sales  
ITD CAPEX Development Person-Days Cost  
ITD OPEX Maintenance Person-Days Cost  
Other OPEX**  
Depreciation/Amortization  
Write-Offs  
Tax Expense  
Operating Cash Flow  
CAPEX Requested  
*Due to tax and depreciation complications 
**Includes the non-IT “business” costs of projects, such as development time needed, training, 
and project monitoring costs 
Source: Company Information 
Exhibit 7. Selected Questions Used to Assess Strategic Value and Risk 
Factor Assessment Question Evaluation Criteria 
Strategic Impact: 
Customer Impact 
Estimate the impacted customer base in a 
5-year time frame. What % of customers 
will use or benefit from the service within 5 
years from now? 
Minimum of sum of % Residential customer 
impact, % Business customer impact and % 
Wholesale customer impacts, or 100% 
How easy is it for the competition to match 
Belgacom's competitive advantage? 
Unmatchable within 1 year (100%) 
Difficult to match within 1 year (80%) 
Difficult to match within 6 months (60%) 
Easy to match within 6 months (40%) 
Not applicable Strategic Impact: 
Competitive Impact 
How easy is it for Belgacom to match the 
competitor's competitive advantage? 
Need at least 1 year to match (40%) 
Difficult to match within 1 year (60%) 
Difficult to match within 6 months (80%) 
Easy to match within 6 months (100%) 
Not applicable 
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